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“For extraordinary heroism
and outstanding performance”
Kap’yong, 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry and the controversy
surrounding the US Presidential Unit Citation
Michelle Fowler

D

espite a growing historiography, the
Canadian experience in Korea is still a very
much forgotten part of our history. Kap’yong, the
marathon battle of 22-25 April 1951 where the
Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry (2PPCLI) along with
their fellow members of the 27th Commonwealth
Infantry Brigade, the Third Battalion Royal
Australian Regiment (3RAR) defended the access
points of the Kap’yong River valley is the one
incident receives significant attention. Without
fail, the description of the battle always ends with
that passing reference, “for their efforts 2PPCLI
were awarded the United States Presidential Unit
Citation.” This brief sentence at the end of a
chapter does little to define the citation let alone
explore its journey from recommendation to its
place as a device on the uniforms of members of
2PPCLI. While the battle itself was epic in the
context of Korea, the story of the Presidential
Unit Citation was not without its own lengthy
ordeal. The award was first recommended in the
spring of 1951. However, the Canadian
government did not officially announce that
members of the Battalion would be able to wear
the individual insignia of the citation until April
1956, a period of some five years.
After the end of the Second World War, the
Korean peninsula was divided much as Germany
was, with the Soviet Union occupying the North
and the United States occupying the South.
Under the auspices of a United Nations [UN]
commission democratic elections were held in
the south, while a communist regime began to

develop in the north. The situation meant two
hostile governments were claiming to be the
legitimate government of the entire Korean
Peninsula.1 Both Koreas and the UN desired
unification but clearly this was becoming
increasingly difficult. Border skirmishes became
commonplace. The situation escalated in 1950
when North Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung “vowed
to liberate the south.”2 War was declared on 25
June 1950. The UN Security Council then voted
“in favour of a US resolution recommending that
members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security to the
area.”3 The passing of the resolution regarding
Korea was only made possible due to the Soviet
boycott of the Security Council.
In early August 1950 Canadian Prime
Minister Louis St. Laurent announced that
Canada would send troops to Korea. This
decision was made in response to a request from
the US government, made on 27 July 1950, for
Canada to provide ground troops for a UN force
in Korea.4 It was also decided that regular force
soldiers would not be sent, but rather, the
Canadian “Special Force” for Korea would
consist mostly of volunteers both civilians and
Second World War veterans.5
The first group to leave for Korea was the
Second Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry. It arrived at Pusan Harbour on
18 December 1950. The American commander
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in Korea wanted to immediately send the
Canadians to the front to help stop the advance
of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF).6 The
Chinese had recently intervened and this was
followed by a retreat of UN forces. 7 The
Battalion’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Jim
Stone, refused the American request. He made
this decision based on the national command
authority given to him by the Canadian
government. This refusal ensured that the
Canadian troops had more training before seeing
any action. However, by mid-January 1951 the
Canadians found themselves caught in the
middle of Communist guerrilla warfare,8 and by
mid-February the Patricias had joined the 27th
British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade (BCIB)
which was advancing against Communist forces
south of the 38th parallel.
After days of advancing north against
Chinese troops, the Canadians were pulled out
to a rest area south of the village of Kap’yong.
The job of holding the new line established north
of the 38th parallel was turned over to the 6th
Republic of Korea (ROK) Division and the
Canadians settled into a period of rest. On Easter
Sunday, 22 April, 1951, the CCF mounted a large
assault, later to be known as the 1951
Communist Spring Offensive,9 on the United

Nations line being held by the ROK division and
the US I and IX Corps. The Americans withdrew
as a result of the massive offensive leaving the
6th ROK to hold the line. The front began to
collapse rapidly.
The area where members of the 27th BCIB,
made up of 3RAR, 2PPCLI and 1st Middlesex
were resting south of Kap’yong was roughly 25
kilometres south of the UN front line. 10
Geographically, Kap’yong is a town at the
confluence of two rivers approximately 40
kilometres northeast of Seoul.11 Therefore the
members of the 27th BCIB were put on the
defensive in the expectation of further Chinese
attacks. The Canadians were given Hill 677 to
defend which was about 5 kilometres across
from the Australians who were defending Hill
504, the highest peaks in the area.12 These hills
were important as they stood at the entrance of
the Kap’yong valley which was being used as a
withdrawal route for the troops of the ROK
escaping the front.13
The Australians were attacked first and
suffered heavy casualties. Their communications
were so badly damaged that their commander
ordered the various company commanders to
engage in a fighting withdrawal. The Canadians

Photo by Bill Olson, NAC PA 115033

Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry photographed shortly after the Battle of Kap’yong.
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Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Stone briefs the members of 2nd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, January 1951.

were then attacked by the Chinese forces. The
PPCLI were encircled and their supply lines were
completely cut and Chinese forces constantly
penetrating their perimeter. The Canadians
valiantly defended their hill, and were even forced
to direct artillery fire on their own positions in
order to halt the infiltration of enemy troops. By
the morning of 25 April the Canadians’ first
major action of the Korean War was over when
the Chinese pulled back away from the route to
Seoul. Canadian casualties in the battle were
minimal. Shortly after the battle was over, it was
announced that the Australian and Canadian
battalions, along with Company A, 72nd US
Heavy Tank Battalion had been recommended
for the US Presidential Unit Citation.

commanding Generals of Armies or higher units
are authorized to award a Presidential Unit
Citation to battlegroups or battalions under their
command. Recommendations have to be
supported with data such as: operational orders
and reports, maps showing terrain and
dispositions and actions of enemy forces,
casualties sustained on both sides as well as a
list of all units participating in the action.17 In
order to be recommended for the citation the
commanders in the field had to ascertain that
the unit being recommended had shown
gallantry and determination in the
accomplishment of their mission. This award is
considered by the Americans to be of great
importance and is not awarded lightly.

The granting of unit awards is done in
recognition of certain types of service and as a
means of promoting esprit de corps. The US
Presidential Unit Citation has the highest degree
of precedence of unit awards which have been
established by the President of the United States
to recognize outstanding heroism.14 Not only is
the Presidential Unit Citation the most
prestigious of American unit awards,
recommendation for the award must go through
proper levels of command and detailed
descriptions of the action must be received and
verified. Clearly it is handled with great
discretion. For example, Australian units have
only received three Presidential Unit Citations
in their history and they have come under US
command more often than Canadian units. Only
one citation was awarded in Korea, the other two
were awarded for action in Vietnam.15 Two
British units were awarded the citation at Imjin,
Korea and these are the only British units to have
ever received the distinction. 16 Only

The criteria established for the award of the
Presidential Unit Citation can be defined as
follows:
The Presidential Unit Citation is awarded to units
of the Armed Forces of the Untied States and
co-belligerent nations for extraordinary heroism
in action against an armed enemy occurring on
or after 7 December 1941. The unit must display
such gallantry, determination and esprit de corps
in accomplishing its mission under extremely
difficult and hazardous conditions as to set it
apart and above other units participating in the
same campaign. The degree of heroism required
is the same as that which would warrant award
of a Distinguished Service Cross to an individual.
Extended periods of combat duty or
participation in a large number of operational
missions, either ground or air is not sufficient.
This award will normally be earned by units that
have participated in single or successive actions
covering relatively brief time spans. It is not
reasonable to presume that entire units can
sustain Distinguished Service Cross
performance for extended time periods except
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Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Omar Bradley
presents Canadian Minister of
National Defence, Brooke Claxton,
with the Presidential Unit Citation.

under the most unusual circumstances. Only on
rare occasions will a unit larger than a battalion
qualify for the award of this decoration.18

As stated in the definition, a unit award is given
to an entire unit for heroism as well as
accomplishment of a particular mission. Its
purpose is to recognize a group effort, not
individual acts of heroism. Typically the citation
is distinguished by a streamer on the unit colours
and emblems worn by individual members of
the unit.
An examination of the criteria for the award
leaves no doubt that 2PPCLI were deserving of
the citation. Though it can be argued that most
of the action was experienced by “B” and “D”
Companies along with the Headquarters
Company, it was still the collective effort of the
entire unit in the interest of a common goal that
made the battle at Kap’yong a success. “A” and
“C” Companies were actively engaged in the
defence of Hill 677, which was their mission. In
addition, a platoon from “C” Company
successfully recaptured a lost machine gun.19
The Presidential Unit Citation can be awarded
to companies within a battalion. For example,
at Kap’yong, only Company “A” of the 72nd Heavy
Tank Battalion was awarded the citation while
“D” Company of the Royal Australian Regiment
was awarded the citation at the Battle of Long
Tan in South Vietnam in 1966. Clearly, the senior
officer who made the recommendation believed
all companies of 2PPCLI withstood the Chinese

attack and as a group
successfully defended Hill
677. Other criteria for the
citation such as heroism,
outstanding performance of
combat duties and the
existence of hazardous
conditions are evident upon
examination of the battle
itself. The Patricias at
Kap’yong were a well-led,
effective fighting force who
made good use of their
experience and combat
skills in order to fend off a
Chinese force numerically
superior to them. They inflicted heavy casualties,
51 dead in front of “B” Company alone,20 and
received very few casualties themselves, 10 killed
and 23 wounded.21
The Canadian government took some time
to accept the award on behalf of the unit and it
appears this may have been done somewhat
reluctantly. Acknowledgement of the award took
time to be confirmed and rumours were
rampant. According to the war diary entry for
27 June 1951, “Congratulatory telegrams have
been arriving for several days, but the official
notification only arrived at 1400 hours today.”22
How the award would be recognized was already
a concern for the men of the Battalion. The war
diary reveals some apprehension on the part of
the members of the unit that they would not be
able to wear the insignia of the award on their
uniforms despite the precedent set by other
British Commonwealth units:
There was considerable speculation amongst the
men and officers as to whether or not we would
be permitted to wear the citation as are the
surviving members of the 1st Gloster Regt. The
feeling of the Battalion is that it should be worn
or at least incorporated into the regimental flash.
The award of the Citation is the first for any
Canadian unit and is unique.23

The delay in the actual acceptance of the
citation has been blamed on an unintentional
breech of protocol by General James Van Fleet,
the American commander who proposed the
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award.
Fleet
had
announced
the
recommendation before official acceptance from
Canada, not realizing that permission from the
monarch was required in order to allow the
acceptance of a foreign award.24 According to the
official history of Canada in the Korean War,
“military circles in Canada regarded this type of
award and its method of presentation as without
precedent in Canadian military experience; never
before had a Canadian formation served directly
under a US Army Commander.”25 However,
notice of the King’s authorization did appear in
the Canada Gazette on 27 October 1951.26 The
indifference felt towards the award on behalf of
certain military officers was best summarized
by the Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel
Jim Stone. In a memo to General Guy Simonds,
Chief of General Staff, in September 1953, Stone
reflected on the awarding of
the citation:

amount of grief for senior Canadian military
officials. One can only speculate as to the reasons
why this was the case but evidence suggests that
military officials were determined to undermine
the awarding of the citation. In fact, it appears
that some wanted the issue of the Presidential
Unit Citation to die a quick and silent death.
Potentially infuriating for members of the
Battalion was that they were never able to wear
evidence of the prestigious honour while serving
in Korea. However, their brigade counterparts,
the 3RAR, as well as the British 1st
Gloucestershire Regiment were allowed to wear
the insignia while still serving in Korea. Both
these regiments had to go through similar
protocols. Britain and Australia each obtained
permission from the monarch and immediately

After the battle at Kap’yong
which was outstanding only
because 2PPCLI was the only
battalion not running, I was
informed by British Brigade
HQ that we had been
recommended for this
citation. Never having been
too impressed with US
awards I almost forgot about
it until I saw in the press that
the Minister of National
Defence had accepted the
award from the US Chief of
General Staff.27

Perhaps the most
controversial aspect of the
awarding of the Presidential
Unit Citation to a Canadian
formation was the decision
as to whether or not
members of the Battalion
would be allowed to wear the
individual insignia of the
award. The five-year delay
between the awarding of the
citation and allowing the
individual insignia of the
citation to be worn on the
Battalion uniforms is
perhaps evidence that the
awarding of the Presidential
Unit Citation to a Canadian
unit caused a certain
23
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thereafter permission was granted for their
troops to wear the citation insignia. In the case
of the “Glosters,” the wearing of the Citation
Badge was approved in Army Order 111 of
1951,28 and the Australian Government gave its
approval for the wearing of the citation
reasonably quickly after the citation was
awarded. The approval for 3RAR was received
from the monarch at the advice of the Australian
Government in 1952.29 Arguably given that
Canada was part of a Commonwealth force in
Korea, it would make sense that Canada heed
the precedent set by Britain and Australia.
Instead, the decision was left to Canadian senior
military officials whose attitude was clearly
stated by General Harry Crerar, the former
commander of First Canadian Army in North
West Europe 1944-1945. In a letter to
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, Chief of
General Staff, Crerar advised:

Crerar’s discomfort with the notion of the
Presidential Unit Citation singling out a
particular unit may have come from the criteria
that in order to be recommended for the award
the unit must have displayed gallantry and
determination that set it apart and above other
units in the campaign. Certainly there were
instances where other units believed they too
performed to the same standards and degree of
gallantry that 2PPCLI had shown at Kap’yong and
therefore felt they deserved a Presidential Unit
Citation. What is important, however, is that to
the commander in the field making the
recommendation, 2PPCLI did perform in a
manner which would set it apart and above other
units in the campaign. This is perhaps best
illustrated by the entry from the Battalion War
Diary for 23 April 1951 which commented on
the performance of 3RAR and 2PPCLI in light of
the actions of the 1st Middlesex;

I am opposed to the procedure of awarding
specific units in the Canadian army special
distinctions by foreign governments…during the
campaign in North-West Europe, I reached the
conclusion that it was impossible to accept from
either the Belgian or US government a unit award
of this type.30

At 2100 hrs the 1 Middlesex, influenced by the
rapid withdrawal of the 6th ROK division and
fearing for the safety of their detached company
withdrew from their assigned area.…the attack
continued without support of the 4.2” mortars
or of the 1 Middlesex Coy assigned to protect
the left flank – the commander of the 3RAR was
forced to relinquish command to company
commanders and 72nd Tank Coy made 11 trips
to the 3RAR positions to evacuate wounded. It
was now the turn of the 2PPCLI to bear the brunt
of attack.36

During the Second World War certain formations
and units were offered the Fourragere (a
shoulder braid created by decree in 1945
awarded to honor bravery exhibited by certain
units in the Second World War by the Belgian
Government31 ) and the US Army made inquiry
as to whether a Presidential Citation would be
accepted for certain Canadian formations.32
According to a memo from General Guy Simonds
to the Defence Minister in October 1953,
the policy established then was that collective
honours of this kind would be represented by
battle honours or distinctions on the regimental
colour and should not be worn by individuals.33

Crerar had been awarded individual foreign
awards during the Second World War from both
the Dutch and Belgians34 which in all likelihood
would have made his statement all the more
infuriating. However, one of the main issues for
Crerar was that it was a unit award:
[The awarding of such an honour] would have
caused in many other units of the same
formation a strong resentment and more damage
to the general morale would have been done than
up lift to the particular morale of the unit
selected to receive it.35

Those who viewed the actions that day clearly
distinguished the performance of 3RAR, 2PPCLI
and the 72nd Tank Company from other units
in the campaign. These units made different
choices than others in the battle, and
accomplished their mission heroically. Thus, it
appears justified that their performance was set
apart from others. Though the presentation of
any award is subjective, the initial
recommendation was based on the observations
and opinions of the Commander in the field that
day. This initial recommendation was then
followed by detailed documentation and other
proof in order to confirm the award. There may
be units who felt they should have been awarded
the citation during the course of the Korean
campaign and were unjustly overlooked, but the
issues of these units should in no way take away
from the fact that the 2PPCLI were awarded the
citation fairly and justifiably, having met all the
requirements.

24
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The uneasiness which may have resulted
from putting 2PPCLI’s performance above others
in the theatre was also evident in a series of
discussions about battle honours for the Korean
campaign which took place in August 1956. A
memo from Major-General N.E. Rodger, Vice
Chief of the General Staff, suggested:

to his previously mentioned disregard for
American awards, the Battalion’s commanding
officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Stone, clarified
his position on the wearing of the individual
insignia to Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds in
a personal letter:
The citation may be awarded down to a platoon
level and is not a battle honour. It is rather a
mass decoration and has been treated as such
by the British and Australian authorities. The
1st Gloucester’s only wear the blue badge and
the 3RAR are the only Australian soldiers to wear
it. It does set them apart and above the rest which
is good for a battalion’s soul.39

It is possible that to award a multiplicity of
honours for such relatively minor operations as
those of the Commonwealth forces in Korea
might have a cheapening effect.
A possible difficulty might be occasioned by the
special importance attached by the PPCLI and
the Glosters to the engagements in April 1951
for which they were awarded US Presidential
citations. However, there were other operations
in Korea equally difficult and costly, at least so
far as the PPCLI operation is concerned; and it
would seem that if these two engagements were
singled out there would be no choice but to do
the same with others. 37

The letters of February 1952 do tell us that
Simonds sought the advice of many despite his
own views. In a letter to Hamilton Gault, the
Honorary Colonel of the Patricias, he stressed
that although still believing that the honour
should not be worn by individuals, he was very
much interested in the advice of Hamilton Gault,
as Simonds understood that “distinctions of this
nature are a natural source of pride to the officers
and men who are instrumental in earning them.”
40
One of the choices that General Simonds
proposed in this series of correspondence was
that,

These statements were part of a series of
letters and memos that circulated between senior
military and ministry officials in September
1953. This particular round in the debate over
awarding the individual insignia to members of
the Battalion was rekindled at the insistence of
a Calgary Herald reporter who, according to
Defence Minister Brooke Claxton, “was pounding
away at us for not allowing the PPCLI to wear
something to evidence their Presidential
Citation.”38 On 18 September 1953 in addition
Photo by Bill Olson, NAC PA 142233

The individual insignia will be worn by all those
officers and men who were actually serving with
the Second Battalion, PPCLI, at the time the
Citation was awarded.41

General Crerar agreed with the proposed course
suggesting, “that would mean the disappearance
of the individual insignia, and so the elimination
of the visible signs of the unit distinction, in
course of time.”42 Ultimately in April 1956, five
years after the stand at Kap’yong it was decided
that the individual insignia would be worn by
members of the Battalion. The final ruling stated,
[The citation] will be worn by past and present
members of the unit. Men who were on strength
at the time of the award will be allowed to wear
the ribbon for all time. Those who joined the
unit since will wear the insignia as long as they
are with the unit, removing it when posted
elsewhere.43

Once the individual insignia was authorized
to be worn on their uniform by members of the
2PPCLI, the Calgary Herald drew attention to
the delay in the decision. The former army Chief
Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Stone, commander of 2PPCLI.
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of the General Staff, General Guy Simonds was
blamed as the primary cause of the delay.
Simonds was interviewed by the Herald after the
decision to allow members of 2PPCLI to wear
the decoration was announced. Simonds stated
that the Department of National Defence decision
was “ill-advised” and that “it is a collective award
and should appear on the regiment’s Battle
Colors only.”44 In addition he suggested that the
British and Australians were “ill-advised, also.”45
The article goes on to suggest that acceptance of
the award only went ahead after Simonds’
retirement. Simonds’ role in the reluctance to
accept the individual insignia is corroborated by
Rod Middleton who served with the 2PPCLI in
Korea but returned to Canada in September
1951. Middleton stated that during the Spring
of 1956 while he was serving as aide-de-camp
to Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence,
for the minister’s visit to Camp Shilo, Manitoba,
the minister asked Middleton to be frank about
how he felt about not being able to wear the
citation. Middleton proceeded to voice that he
was quite upset about the unfairness of the
army’s decision. Claxton then “assured
(Middleton) that within 60 days authority would
be received.”46 General Simonds retired and
authority to wear the insignia was established.47
Historian David Bercuson suggests, as do
many other histories, that the delay in
recognizing the citation was a result of the
American breech of protocol in that they did not
seek permission of the crown.48 Canada was
obliged to accept the Presidential Citation “rather
than risk offending,” according to General
Simonds.49 This was only one factor, but even
then Canadians should question why other
countries of the Commonwealth in similar
situations chose a very different route. Britain
and Australia not only graciously accepted the
award after receiving permission from the
monarch they allowed their troops to show
evidence of it on their uniforms. If the issue is
one of Canadian sovereignty then perhaps
Canadians should choose which sovereignty
battles to fight. It would make sense to raise the
issue of sovereignty if it was thought that the
well-being of Canadian troops was in jeopardy.
Opposite: Two members of 2PPCLI carry rations to their
slit trenches in the mountains. In the background in the
valley is the 2PPCLI forward headquarters. The terrain is
very similar to the Kap’yong area. Photo taken in March
1951.

For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Stone’s refusal
of an American request that the Canadians
immediately join the front to help stop the
advance of the Chinese Communist Forces. By
refusing this request Stone ensured that his
troops had more training before seeing any
action. In the case of accepting the Presidential
Unit Citation, it is difficult to understand how
denying an entire battalion individual recognition
contributes in any concrete way to a strengthened
Canadian identity.
The memos and letters that transpired
between senior military officials reveal that there
was much more to the delay in recognizing the
citation than an unintentional breech of protocol.
These officers were not only reluctant to
recognize the honour, some were hoping that it
would disappear in time. One can only speculate
as to the motivations of these senior officials.
Perhaps it was purely concern over the effect on
morale as a whole if one unit was singled out,
especially since it would only be one battalion of
a regiment that would perpetuate the distinction.
Perhaps there were even elements of jealousy that
this young group of upstarts and veterans who
enthusiastically volunteered for Korea were being
awarded an honour that was not bestowed on
other men who survived the ordeals and battles
of the Second World War, but were denied such
awards due to established practice. 50 The
considerations of these senior officials were
reasonable although emotion certainly had its
place in the deliberations. Nonetheless the
practice of a unit showing the individual insignia
of a collective award was already adopted by
fellow units in the Commonwealth adhering to
similar traditions. By any standards five years
to make a decision is excessive.
The Presidential Unit Citation awarded to
2PPCLI for their gallant stand at Kap’yong is now
proudly mentioned in the books, websites,
museums and exhibits which chronicle Canada’s
role in the Korean War. The prestige and
uniqueness of the award is now emphasized,
ironically often touted is the fact that 2PPCLI is
the only Canadian unit to have received such an
honour. It is difficult to understand why
recognition took so long and Canadians should
learn from this experience that a gracious act
on the part of the Americans can be embraced
as a sign of the skill and gallantry of the Canadian
soldier. Most certainly, as Canadians increasingly
27
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examine the merits of military interoperability
and cooperation with the US this situation is
bound to arise again. In fact according to the
National Post in 2002, Bronze Stars awarded
by Americans to Canadian snipers who
participated in operations in Afghanistan were
delayed due to reasons of Canadian protocol.51
Perhaps, rather than fear for our identity or show
trepidation over the establishment of new
traditions, Canadians should at least consider
that our allies’ recognition of Canadian
capabilities can be a proud part of who we are.
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